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AFTER ESPINOZA: WHAT’S LEFT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE?
Carl H. Esbeck*
21 Federalist Society Review 186 (2020)

On June 30, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its decision in
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue. 1 In a 5 to 4 ruling, the Supreme Court held that
when there is an educational program with a secular purpose the Free Exercise Clause requires
that the program be administered without regard to the religious status of the service providers.
Additional examples of qualifying secular-purpose programs might pertain to health care,
social services, emergency disaster assistance, or low-interest loans for economic relief. Stated
more generally, the principle is that a government cannot enact a law or program that
purposefully discriminates against a religion, a practice because it is religious, or an individual
because of his or her religious status. 2
In 2015, the Montana legislature created a program to expand parental choice in
primary and secondary education. The statute provided an income tax credit for any state
income taxpayer who donated money to a student scholarship organization. In turn, these
scholarship organizations use the donations to fund scholarships for students attending private
K-12 schools. Kendra Espinoza and other plaintiffs enrolled their children in private religious
schools. Ms. Espinoza successfully applied for scholarships to defray the cost of tuition for her
two daughters. However, the tax credits and tuition awards were halted following a
determination by the state supreme court that the credits indirectly aided religious schools
contrary to a provision of the state constitution. 3
The decision in Espinoza built on Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 4 where the
Supreme Court held that a childcare center could not be denied a Missouri grant to pay for a
new playground surface to enhance child safety simply because of the center’s status as
operated by a church. With reference to a state constitutional prohibition on government aid
going to a religious organization—a provision similar to that in Montana—the state of Missouri
denied the funding because of the grantee’s religious status. This purposeful discrimination was
found to violate the Free Exercise Clause. For some, Trinity Lutheran was distinguishable from
Espinoza because the aid was for playground safety, 5 which was perceived to be more secular
in character than the religious elementary schools being assisted in Espinoza.
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1
140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., for the Court, joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ).
2
See also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); McDaniel v. Paty, 435
U.S. 618 (1978) (plurality opinion).
3
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2252-54.
4
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
5
Id. at 2024 n.3 (limiting holding to aid for playground resurfacing).
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Two decades ago, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Helms held that the Establishment
Clause permitted a government program of secular purpose to directly confer benefits to K-12
schools, including religious schools, so long as care was taken that the aid monies not be
diverted to an explicitly religious purpose. 6 When it came to indirect forms of aid, the Court
has been even more lenient in finding the Establishment Clause satisfied. 7 In the latter instance,
such as with school vouchers and tuition tax deductions, both forms of indirect aid, the power
to choose is in the hands of the ultimate beneficiary who then exercises that power by selecting
the service provider, whether secular or religious. Because the beneficiary is not a state actor, it
does not matter should the benefit find its way to a religious provider where it could advance
explicitly religious beliefs or practices. With indirect benefits, all that matters is that the aid
accomplishes its designated public purpose.
The Court in Espinoza observed that “the parties do not dispute that the [aid] is
permissible under the Establishment Clause. Nor could they.” 8 This makes sense only because
the type of aid was indirect via tax credits. When the aid is indirect, it makes no difference
whether the aid inures to the benefit of explicitly religious practices at recipient schools.
However, in government programs where the nature of the aid is direct, Mitchell is still
controlling. In that case, a religious provider is required to self-monitor to prevent diversion of
the government funds to explicitly religious practices. 9
Chief Justice Roberts limited the holding in Espinoza to status-based discrimination. 10
As he did in Trinity Lutheran, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that a distinction between religious
status and religious use made little sense. 11 What good is a right to be Catholic if there is no
right to practice your Catholicism? Chief Justice Roberts said he acknowledged the point but
that it need not be examine here. 12 Moreover, Roberts conceded that two of the Court’s
previous free exercise holdings struck down restrictions on a religious use. 13 Nevertheless, the
Espinoza majority did not abandon the status/use distinction. Indeed, the Chief Justice did not
6
530 U.S. 793 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion of four justices). The controlling opinion in Mitchell was that
by Justice O’Connor, id. at 836, concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Breyer. See Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977) (explaining that when Supreme Court fails to issue majority opinion, the opinion of the members
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds is controlling).
7
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding school vouchers for K-12 schools, including
religious schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (providing special education services
to Catholic student not prohibited by Establishment Clause); Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a state vocational rehabilitation grant to disabled student choosing to use grant for
training as cleric); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1983) (upholding a state income tax deduction for
parents paying tuition at public and private schools, including religious schools).
8
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2254.
9
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 860-67 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (setting forth monitoring requirement for direct aid).
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is the controlling plurality opinion in Mitchell. See supra note 6.
10
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2254-57.
11
Id. at 2275-78 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025-26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in
part, joined by J. Thomas). One reason the status/use distinction should be abandon is that the plain text of the
First Amendment phrase protects religious “exercise,” a word that entails not just one’s religious status but the
conduct necessary to use one’s religious status by acting on it.
12
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257.
13
Id. (citing Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520, and Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)).
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overrule Locke v. Davey, 14 and one reason for preserving Locke was that the state there had
discriminated on the basis of use not status. 15 In Locke, the State of Washington prohibited use
of a college merit scholarship where the student was pursuing a degree to become a church
pastor or cleric. The scholarship could be used at a religious college or university, and it could
be used to enroll in classes offered by the religion department. Only use of the aid to pursue a
divinity degree was prohibited. 16
Going forward, the Free Exercise Clause requires religious schools to be able to
compete for secular programing without discrimination due to their religious status. To be sure,
the government may require that recipient schools, including religious schools, be accredited.
In that way, the state is assured that it receives full secular educational value in return for its
aid. And, in accord with Mitchell, when the type of aid is direct the school is to prevent
diversion of the aid to explicitly religious purposes. But that is the end of the state’s educational
interests. It does not matter that religious schools also provide their students with a religious
education and an integrated secular/sacred environment for nurturing the faith. Indeed, the
religious character of a school is often a material reason that parents select it for their children.
This approach also has the virtue of reducing regulatory entanglement between church and
state.
Espinoza does not mean that a state is compelled to provide funding for K-12 religious
schools. A state may continue to provide money and other aid only to its public schools,
thereby excluding all similarly situated private schools, whether nonsectarian or religious. 17
That too is discrimination of a sort, but it is not discrimination based on religion.
The rationale behind Espinoza is to enlarge religious choice (historically termed
religious “voluntarism”) within the educational, health care, and social-service initiatives of the
modern welfare state. It avoids putting pressure on individuals and religious organizations
through financial incentives by the government that are biased against religion. For example, if
people want to obtain drug rehabilitation counseling at their church rather than from a secular
agency, they ought to have that choice. If that freedom of choice is to be meaningful, then
church-affiliated rehabilitation centers have to be equally eligible for government funding. Of
course, the religious providers have to meet the same criteria for proficiency and success as do
eligible secular providers, but their mere religious status should not disqualify them from public
aid.
In Espinoza, Montana became purposefully discriminatory only after state tax officials
and later the state supreme court determined that the state constitution did not permit religious
schools to participate in the scholarship program. Accordingly, while the original legislation
was intended to assist all private schools, secular and religious, as finally implemented the law
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257.
16
Locke, 540 U.S. at 720-25.
17
See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973); Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Mo.),
aff’d mem., 419 U.S. 888 (1974); Brusca v. State Bd. of Educ., 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff’d mem., 405
U.S. 1050 (1972).
14
15
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turned out to be non-neutral because of the state constitutional exclusion. Because the
discrimination was intentional, the Free Exercise Clause was violated. Had the claim concerned
generally applicable legislation that was neutral as to religion, then the law of Employment
Division v. Smith 18 would have applied. Under Smith, generally applicable legislation that has
an adverse but unintended impact on religion does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 19
Now that the Supreme Court has adopted a rule that government aid for education,
health care, social services, and other such secular-purpose programs must be available to
providers without regard to religious status, what is left of the Establishment Clause? Just a few
decades back many a commentator would have written with confidence that access to taxpayer
funds for pervasively religious schools was a clear violation of the Establishment Clause. So, it
has to be difficult for them to see a future for a clause that should be, from their point of view,
the chief guarantor of the separation of church and state. Yet, despite what these commentators
might be thinking, Espinoza can be seen not as a break with separationist doctrine but as an
extension of it.
In trying to properly interpret the Establishment Clause, the Espinoza Court sought to
prevent government from putting its thumb on the scale in a way that burdens private religious
judgment. In that light, Part I takes up the rule that the Establishment Clause forbids the
government from preferring religion, or from taking sides in favor of religion in a private
dispute. At the same time, the clause permits the government to exempt religion from
regulatory burdens and taxes imposed on others. The state thereby leaves religion alone, and a
state does not establish a religion by leaving it alone. In short, exemptions are not preferences.
In Part II, I turn to the very different question concerning how the Establishment Clause
addresses government symbols and other speech of religious content on public lands. With its
vast resources, the government has a powerful and influential voice. When it speaks on
religion, however, the issue is whether the government is turning its back on individual choice
by taking sides among religions or favoring religion over its opposite. Parts III and IV take up
the Court’s prohibition on deciding religious questions, which in turn is part of a larger
category of cases decided under the church autonomy doctrine. The latter doctrine is about
letting the church be the church. Finally, Part V briefly addresses the difficult task of giving not
too broad and not too narrow a meaning to “religion” as that word appears in the First
Amendment.
The integrating principle behind many of these Establishment Clause matters is not
about preventing the government from doing things that might work to the benefit of religion.
Rather, it is to keep government from interfering with the private religious choices made by
citizens, as well as walling off matters of the internal governance by religious bodies from
interference by the state. Seen from that vantage, Espinoza is of a piece with a separation of
church and state that minimizes the role of government in private religious judgments, all while
expanding the liberty to exercise one’s religious faith.

18
19

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 879-82.
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I. PREFERENCES, EXEMPTIONS, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. What is a Religious Preference?
If we look back at the last century, there are examples of religious preferences that
strike us as crude today. Government cannot penalize blasphemy, sacrilege, or other expression
that speaks ill of a religion. 20 Government cannot compel an individual, upon pain of material
penalty, inconvenience, or loss of public benefit, to profess a religious belief 21 or to observe an
explicitly religious practice. 22
A plainspoken way of defining a religious preference is that the government is taking
sides on a religious question. The establishment of a state church is the quintessential act of
taking sides on a religious matter. The Establishment Clause prohibits government from
purposefully discriminating between or among religions, 23 and from using classifications based
on denominational or church affiliation to extend benefits 24 or to impose burdens. 25
On the other hand, the government may use classifications based on a person’s religious
See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (striking down law permitting censorship of films that
are “sacrilegious”).
21
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (overturning requirement of an oath declaring belief in God
as a prerequisite for public office). Concerning compelled speech, this is an area where the purview of the Free
Speech and Establishment Clauses overlap. Additionally, the Constitution provides that there may be no religious
test for federal office. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
22
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise.”).
23
See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (unconstitutional discrimination in state regulatory legislation
adverse to new religious movements); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (ordinance permitting church
services in park but no other type of religious meetings was a way of unconstitutionally preferring some religious
groups over others based on a given sect’s type of religious gatherings or occasion for delivering sermons);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (unconstitutional to deny use of city park for Bible talks when
permits were issued for worship services by other religious organizations and for Sunday school picnics).
When a law of nondiscriminatory purpose has a disparate effect on a religious organization, the
Establishment Clause is not violated. See Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 696
(1989); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (effect on religious groups was not
purposeful, but the unintended effect of IRS’s facially neutral, secular regulation); Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 n.23.
24
“Benefit” means affirmative financial assistance for a secular purpose in the nature of a subsidy, grant,
entitlement, loan, or insurance, as well as a tax credit or deduction. A tax exemption, such as that upheld for
religious organizations in Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), is to be distinguished from tax credits and
deductions. A tax exemption is considered government’s election to “leave religion where it found it” and is thus
not considered a benefit. The idea that exemptions, credits, and deductions for organizations should all be regarded
alike as “tax expenditures,” while useful in other areas of legal policy, does not make sense in dealing with issues
that arise under the Religion Clauses. See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 345 (1976); Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes
and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969).
25
Kiryas Joel Bd. of Ed. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702-08 (1994) (plurality opinion in part); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); see Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 n.23 (further explaining Gillette). If the rule stated in the
text was not the law, then merely holding religious membership would result in the availability of a civil
advantage. For example, it would violate the rule stated in the text if Congress were to confer conscientious
objector draft status “on all Quakers,” for that may induce conversions (real or pseudo) to Quakerism.
20
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beliefs or practices—as distinct from denominational affiliation—to lift civil burdens from
those individuals. For example, Congress may confer conscientious objector draft status “on
religious pacifists who oppose war in any form.” 26 Government cannot use classifications that
single out a particular religion’s practice for favoritism, as opposed to favoring a general
category of religious observance. 27 For example, prison authorities may accommodate religious
dietary requirements, but they may not accommodate only kosher diets. The latter would be a
Jewish preference that violates the Establishment Clause. To accommodate religious prisoners
and still satisfy the Establishment Clause, authorities should permit inmates to request food that
meets dietary requirements of all religions in the prison population.
More generally, it is an unconstitutional preference for government to confer a benefit
targeted on a religion or on those observing a particular religious practice. 28 Estate of Thornton
v. Caldor, Inc. is the leading case. 29 The Connecticut legislature was about to repeal its law
prohibiting retailing on Sunday. Anticipating that the repeal would lead to scheduling conflicts
between employers and churchgoing employees, the legislature took the side of the employee
over the retail employer. 30 The new statute read in part: “No person who states that a particular
day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such
day.” 31 Donald Thornton was an employee of Caldor, Inc., a retail department store. He was a
Presbyterian and observed Sunday as his Sabbath. 32 When the store began opening on Sundays,
Thornton worked his Sabbath once or twice a month. Unhappy with the situation, he invoked
the statute and demanded Sundays off. The store resisted, and the State Board of Mediation
filed a lawsuit on Thornton’s behalf. The store argued that the Connecticut statute violated the
Establishment Clause, and the Court agreed. 33
The Supreme Court found that the Connecticut law forced the private sector to assist in
the religious observance of fellow citizens. That is what a preference often does: the
government compels one private citizen to help another private citizen better conform to his or
her religion. 34 The religious preference in Caldor was doubly offensive, for the statutory right
26
See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 448-60; Grumet, 512 U.S. at 715-16 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). Government can either treat all religions alike, not concerning itself with unintended effects, or
government can purposefully lift civic burdens from individuals based on their religious practices. What is
impermissible is to lift such burdens based on an individual’s denominational or religious affiliation.
27
See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (striking down state law favoring Sabbath
observance); cf. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 145 n.11 (1987) (explaining and
distinguishing Caldor); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion). For
example, if Saturday as a day of rest is required to be accommodated by employers, then all religious days of rest
must be accommodated. If a student absence from public school is excused for Good Friday, then so must
absences for all religious holy days.
28
See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 702-08 (legislation favoring one particular religious sect is unconstitutional); Texas
Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14-15 (plurality opinion) (overturning sales tax exemption for those purchasing religious
sacred writings).
29
472 U.S. at 709-11.
30
Id. at 705-06.
31
Id. at 706.
32
Id. at 705-06.
33
Id. at 706-07, 710–11.
34
See id. at 708 (“[G]overnment . . . must take pains not to compel people to act in the name of any religion.”),
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was “unyielding.” That is, the statute took no notice of the commercial burden imposed on the
employer or of the inconvenience to Thornton’s co-workers who would have to fill in during
his absence on Sundays. 35 An unyielding statute was found to transgress the Establishment
Clause.
It is possible for a religious preference to pass constitutional challenge. In TWA v.
Hardison, decided a few years before Caldor, the statutory provision in question—a
requirement that employers adjust to the needs of their religious employees 36—was a religious
preference. 37 However, the Court upheld the law because the employer’s duty of
accommodation was not unyielding, as it was in Caldor, for the duty in TWA dissolved if the
employer could show “undue hardship.” 38 The Supreme Court did not reach the claim that the
law requiring accommodations for religious employees—section 2000e(j) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act—violated the Establishment Clause, 39 albeit the prospect of such a ruling
influenced the Court’s interpretation of the statute. 40 The Court held:
To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give [the
employee-claimant] Saturdays off is an undue hardship. Like abandonment of
the seniority system, to require TWA to bear additional costs when no such costs
are incurred to give other employees the days off that they want would involve
unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their religion. 41
Congress enacted § 2000e(j) to address a conflict created by private market forces. The
government stepped into that conflict and took the side of the religious claimant over that of the
employer. In that sense, § 2000e(j) is like the statute in Caldor, a religious preference that
raised Establishment Clause concerns. 42 However, unlike in Caldor, the § 2000e(j) preference
was not absolute: employers did not have to comply if they could show that the requested
accommodation would create “undue hardship.” 43 The TWA Court avoided reaching the
Establishment Clause question by interpreting the preference as relieving the employer from
the duty to accommodate an employee when the burden was more than de minimis. 44 So long as
710.
35
Id. at 708–10.
36
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Care should be exercised to not confuse Title VII’s preference favoring religious
employees in § 2000e(j), a duty imposed on employers, with Title VII’s exemptions for religious employers found
in §§ 2000e-1(a) and 2000e-2(e)(2). TWA involved the former and Amos the latter.
37
432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977).
38
See id. at 84–85.
39
See id. at 69 n.4.
40
See id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s interpretation of the statute, by effectively nullifying it, has
the singular advantage of making consideration of [TWA’s] constitutional challenge unnecessary.”).
41
Id. at 84 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted).
42
The Title VII accommodation at issue in TWA is not to be confused with general civil rights antidiscrimination
statutes. Rather, it is a mandate to prefer employees who need affirmative help to both be employed and practice
their religion. The latter asks of the private sector to take on a new obligation so that the employee can better
practice his religion. It is a plea for special treatment, not equal treatment. Hence, it is rightly characterized as a
preference.
43
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
44
See TWA, 432 U.S. at 84.
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the statutory preference costs the employer nothing or next to nothing, it is harmless to the
employer, and therefore the forced accommodation did not in fact burden the employer. That
being so, the Court quite consciously misinterpreted what Congress required of the employer.
And we now know, after Caldor, that it needlessly did so under the belief that the Court had to
give this strained interpretation to save the statute from violating the Establishment Clause. So
long as the accommodation is not unyielding but balances the competing interests of employer
and employee, the statute does not fail the Caldor rule against religious preferences. 45
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc. is another example of an unconstitutional preference. 46
Larkin struck down a municipal ordinance that gave churches the right to veto the issuance of
liquor licenses to businesses within a 500-foot radius of a church. 47 Religious interests were
preferred by the city over private retailing interests, and the preference was unyielding. The
Court hastened to point out that it was not uncommon for cities to consider, along with other
factors, the desire of churches to be free from noisy and rowdy neighbors. Such considerations
are constitutional, but a zoning ordinance cannot take the next step and grant an absolute
preference in favor of church interests over competing commercial interests. 48
B. Religious Exemptions Are Not Preferences
The Establishment Clause is not violated when government enacts regulatory or tax
legislation but provides an exemption from these burdens for individuals or organizations
holding religious beliefs or practices. Such exemptions are at the discretion of a legislature and
have as their purpose to ameliorate hardships borne by religious minorities and other dissenters
who find themselves out of step with the prevailing social or legal culture. Statutory religious
exemptions are common in our nation where there is a long and venerable tradition of religious
tolerance.
A categorical mistake has emerged in the secondary literature (but not the case law)
where statutory religious exemptions are conflated with religious preferences. The two are quite
different. As to preferences, it is entirely proper to be concerned when a government
intentionally favors religion over the secular. Being able to distinguish an exemption from a
preference is paramount.
A true exemption ensures that a regulatory or tax burden imposed on others is not also
45
When it has the right case petitioning for review, expect the Court to give the text of § 2000e(j) a more normal
reading and overrule TWA. It will remain a preference for religious employees, but one that is not unyielding to the
interests of employers.
46
459 U.S. 116 (1982).
47
See id. at 117.
48
Id. at 124 nn.7–8, 125. There is commentary in Larkin suggesting that the constitutional offense was that the
municipal ordinance delegated sovereign authority to a religious organization. Id. at 125-27. But the fact that the
ordinance created an unyielding preference for religious interests over business interests was quite enough to
justify the holding. In a modern regulatory state, many tasks formerly done by the government are delegated to the
private sector. Just as the issuance of state drivers’ licenses can be delegated to an independent contractor, so can
the issuance of liquor licenses. There are few exclusive sovereign functions. It is best to regard Larkin as a
straightforward case of striking down an unyielding religious preference.
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required of the religiously devout, the latter being already predisposed to conform to their faith.
Government does not establish religion by choosing to leave it alone. Because the religious
devotion of the one invoking the exemption—not the government’s decision to withhold
regulation—is the driving force behind the devotee’s religious observance, any harm that
befalls a third party is the result of privately motivated conduct.
In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, a janitor was dismissed from
employment by his church-affiliated employer for failing to tithe to the church. He filed a
claim for religious discrimination. 49 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 50 exempts
religious employers from such claims when the adverse employment decision is motivated by
the religious beliefs or practices of the employer. 51 The janitor claimed that this exemption
violated the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court readily acknowledged that the janitor
suffered a religious burden. 52 However, he was harmed by the actions of his own church, not as
a consequence of the exemption provided by Congress. As Justice Byron White wrote for the
Court, “Undoubtedly, [the janitor’s] freedom of choice in religious matters was impinged upon,
but it was the Church . . . and not the Government, who put him to the choice of altering his
religious practices or losing his job.” 53
A helpful way to think about Amos is to draw on the doctrine of state action. When a
legislature passes a statute that says an entity in the private sector may take a certain action, it is
not state action when that entity later avails itself of the opportunity. In Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks, a state legislature permitted landlords to use self-help in removing the possessions of a
tenant who was behind on the rent and had abandoned the leasehold. 54 A landlord availed
himself of the self-help option. The tenant later sued the landlord for removing the tenant’s
property without adequate notice and opportunity for a hearing as required by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The lawsuit was dismissed because the Fourteenth
Amendment only binds state actors, and the landlord’s exercise of self-help was not state
action.
A true preference arises when government takes note of a religious dispute and then
proceeds to impose its resolution on the conflict. These disputes often emerge in situations not
of the state’s creation, usually from private social or market forces. When the legislature’s
intervening law takes the side of the religious disputant, the government is intentionally
preferring religious over the secular interests. If the government’s resolution of the dispute goes
on to unyieldingly side with religion such that any consequential harm to third parties is not
also weighed in the balance, then the Supreme Court will strike down the preference. The
prototypical case is Caldor, striking down a law where Connecticut took the side of a religious
claimant in a dispute with his employer.
483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
51
The exemption is an affirmative defense to any claim under Title VII, even a claim for retaliation. It begins with
the text “This title shall not apply to . . . .”. Id. at § 2000e—1(a).
52
Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15.
53
Id.
54
436 U.S. 149 (1978).
49
50

9

Similar to the rationale in Amos is that in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York. 55 The
Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a municipal property tax exemption for churches
and other houses of worship advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The
Court 8-1 held that it did not. The Walz Court reached two conclusions of law. First, it held that
the tax exemption for religious organizations was not a subsidy, but the government electing
not to impose a tax burden on religion and thereby leaving religion alone. 56 In the Court’s own
words, the “grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer
part of its revenue to churches but [it] simply abstains from demanding that the church support
the state.” 57 The Court distinguished an exemption from a subsidy saying that it “cannot read
New York’s statute as attempting to establish religion; it is simply sparing the exercise of
religion from the burden of property taxation levied on [others].” 58 The proposition is simple:
government does not establish religion by leaving it alone. As to the virtue of “leaving churches
alone” arising from the principle of church-state separation, the Court observed: “The hazards
of churches supporting government are hardly less in their potential than the hazards of
government supporting churches; each relationship carries some involvement rather than the
desired insulation and separation.” 59 Unlike a religious preference, a tax exemption for
religious entities “tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation [thereby] insulating
each from the other.” 60
Second, the Walz Court rejected a quid pro quo argument as a justification for
upholding the tax exemption. The tax commission had argued that the exemption was valid
because it compensated religious groups for generating social capital by providing the poor and
needy with welfare services, education, and health care. 61 Religious charities do just that, of
course, but viewing the tax exemption as a reward for good works invites unconstitutional
entanglement by way of “governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth of particular
social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the
policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.” 62 Moreover, a reward-for-works rationale would risk
violating the rule against authorities taking up religious questions concerning the validity,
meaning, or importance of religious beliefs and practices. The rationale behind the noreligious-questions rule is that the government lacks the competence to make judgments
concerning the civic value of the social work of religious organizations. To contemplate civil
courts passing on such questions implies an established state church against which
“unapproved” ministries and “underperforming” churches are civilly tested and found wanting.
The Walz Court noted that religious organizations were not the only ones that received
tax-exempt status under the city ordinance, but were joined by art, educational, and poverty397 U.S. 664 (1970).
See id. at 675.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 673.
59
Id. at 675 (footnote omitted).
60
Id. at 676.
61
Id. at 674.
62
Id.
55
56
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relief organizations. 63 However, the Court did not say that the inclusion of secular nonprofit
organizations in the tax exemption was necessary to its holding. Indeed, in cases like Amos 64
and Zorach v. Clauson, 65 the Court has upheld exemptions that were exclusive to religion.
In addition to Amos and Walz, the Supreme Court has in five other instances rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge to a discretionary religious exemption. In Cutter v. Wilkinson,
the Court upheld the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 66
which accommodates religious observance by prison inmates otherwise subject to correctional
policies. 67 In Gillette v. United States, a religious exemption from the military draft for those
opposed to all war was found not to violate the Establishment Clause. 68 The Court in Zorach v.
Clauson found that a public school policy of release from a state compulsory education law to
allow pupils to attend voluntary religion classes away from the school grounds did not violate
the Establishment Clause. 69 In Arver v. United States, the military draft exemptions during
World War I pertaining to clergy, seminarians, and pacifists were found not to violate the
Establishment Clause. 70 Finally, in Goldman v. United States, the Court summarily rejected
constitutional claims to the same draft exemptions, relying on the newly decided holding in
Arver. 71
Academics who attack religious exemptions often blur the line between exemptions and
preferences to make their case against the former. 72 These scholars were particularly distressed
by the decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 73 with its broad application of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 74 that brought relief to a closely held for-profit
corporation. In some instances, no doubt, elected lawmakers should exercise their discretion and
narrow or deny an exemption sought by religiously faithful people. It is entirely proper for
legislators to consider any palpable harm to third parties as part of the overall political calculus.
This is the familiar interest balancing by the two political branches, legislative and executive. But
elected lawmakers are not constitutionally prohibited from enacting religious exemptions. And
Id. at 666–67 & n.1, 673.
Amos, 483 U.S. at 338–39.
65
343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (upholding a local public school release-time policy that exempted students from a
state compulsory education attendance law to attend religion classes).
66
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.
67
544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
68
401 U.S. at 448–60.
69
343 U.S. at 308–15.
70
245 U.S. 366, 376, 389 (1918).
71
245 U.S. 474, 476 (1918). Arver and Goldman also illustrate that a religious exemption can be granted by a
legislature even in the absence of coercion of religious conscience. The World War I exemption to the draft
embraced not only religious pacifists, but also clergy and seminarians without regard to the latter two showing
they would suffer a religious burden if drafted. See Arver, 245 U.S. at 367.
72
See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby
Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAN. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 54-55, 61-62 (2014); Frederick Mark
Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 357-71 (2014).
73
573 U.S. 682 (2014) (holding that RFRA required exemption from requirement in Affordable Care Act that
employers provide health care benefits contrary to their religious beliefs).
74
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.
63
64
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once the political branches have struck their balance and enacted a law with a religious exemption,
the judicial branch should not rebalance the equities under the guise of discovering a constitutional
violation.
II. GOVERNMENT SYMBOLS AND OTHER EXPRESSION WITH RELIGIOUS CONTENT
The Establishment Clause prevents the government from using its vast powers of
communication to promote explicitly religious beliefs and practices. 75 Accordingly, the
government may neither confess explicitly religious beliefs 76 nor advocate that individuals
profess such beliefs or observe religious practices. 77 However, government may acknowledge
the role of religion in society and teach about its contributions to, for example, history,
literature, music, charity, architecture, and the visual arts. 78
The Supreme Court has struggled with whether the Establishment Clause is implicated
when a motto, anthem, official seal, or patriotic pledge places the government’s imprimatur on
monotheism 79 or on an explicitly religious belief or practice. 80 For example, on the same day
See Westside Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“[T]here is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private
speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”) (emphasis in original).
76
The Supreme Court has found that prayer, devotional Bible reading, veneration of the Ten Commandments,
classes in confessional religion, and the biblical story of creation are explicitly religious. See Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (teacher-led prayer); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (teacher-led prayer
and Bible reading); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (teaching religion); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578 (1987) (teaching creationism in science class); Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (barring the teaching of
evolution in science class). On the other hand, legislation restricting abortion, Sunday closing laws, rules
prohibiting interracial marriage, teenage sexuality counseling, and loaning secular textbooks are not explicitly
religious. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (abortion restrictions); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961) (Sunday closing law); Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 604 n.30 (student interracial dating); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589 (1988) (teenage sexuality counseling); Central Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244 (1968)
(textbooks).
77
See McCollum, 333 U.S. 203 (facilitating the teaching of religion); Engel, 370 U.S. 421 (teacher-led prayer);
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (prayer and devotional Bible reading); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
(encouraging prayer); Edwards, 482 U.S. 578 (teaching creationism); Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (prohibiting teaching
evolution); Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (prayer). But cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative
chaplain and prayer).
There are narrow exceptions to this rule in situations where government has isolated an individual from
his or her religious community, such as in the armed forces or prisons. In these “special environments,”
government may bring religion to the individual because government is responsible for the individual’s inability to
obtain the requisite religious services at his or her own initiative. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“[H]ostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusal to provide chaplains and places of worship
for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the State from all civilian opportunities for public communion.”).
78
See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 606-08 (Powell, J., concurring); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225; McCollum, 333 U.S. at
235-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
79
America’s governmental institutions have long acknowledged general theism in such forms as the national
motto (“In God We Trust”), the Pledge of Allegiance (“. . . one nation, under God, indivisible . . .”), and patriotic
music (“God Bless America”). The idea that our governmental institutions are in a sense “under God” was present
at America’s founding, and the political philosophy is reflected in many of its constituting documents and the
words of early statesmen. See Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465-72 (1892)
(numerous references to America's religious origins); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
75
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that a government’s display of the Ten Commandments was found constitutional, a similar
display of the Ten Commandments was found unconstitutional. 81 While teacher-led prayer in
public schools has consistently been struck down, 82 prayer by a state legislative chaplain has
been sustained. 83
In Town of Greece v. Galloway, 84 the Supreme Court upheld a municipal practice of
beginning meetings of the town governing board with a prayer delivered by a variety of local
volunteer clergy. As historical precedent, the Court referred to prayers before the Continental
Congress and the approval by the First Federal Congress of paid legislative chaplains. While
some of the prayers were explicitly Christian, none disparaged other religions. The Galloway
Court went on to reject four alternatives offered by those challenging the prayers. Each option
was itself forbidden by the Establishment Clause. The alternatives were: (1) to allow only
nonsectarian prayer, a limitation that officials could enforce only by parsing and censoring the
content of each prayer; 85 (2) to allow only prayer offered by individuals chosen through a
process of “religious balancing” based on local demographics, inviting more intense
involvement by officials with competing religions; 86 (3) to offer only prayers acceptable to a
majority of Americans, a none too subtle establishment of a national religion; 87 or, (4) to script
prayers that aligned with an American “civic religion,” a mix of patriotism and nationalism that
competes with genuine religions and that the Court had earlier rejected as a form of religious
(same). As Justice William O. Douglas observed for the Court concerning America in Zorach, “We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” 343 U.S. at 313.
80
Elected and other high public officials may, without violating the First Amendment, be particularistic about
religious faith when they speak. In America, pronouncements by elected officials that interweave patriotism and
religion have a long and venerable tradition. Familiar examples are presidential speeches that call upon God’s
providence as the nation faces some new challenge or adventure or addresses that conclude with “. . . may God
bless America,” celebrating Thanksgiving as a day for collective acknowledge of God’s hand in the harvest and
other good favor, and the practice started by George Washington of taking the presidential oath of office with the
added “. . . so help me God.” See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312-13 (dicta approving of “appeals to the Almighty in the
messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; ‘so help me God’ in our
courtroom oaths” and “the supplication with which the Court opens each session: ‘God save the United States and
this Honorable Court’”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same).
81
Compare McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (Ten Commandments in county courthouse display
case unconstitutional) with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Ten Commandments monument on grounds
of state capitol constitutional).
82
See Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prayer offered by student at solemn occasion that
authorities had set aside at beginning of high school football game violated the Establishment Clause).
83
See Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (approving prayer by chaplain at beginning of state legislative day).
84
572 U.S. 565 (2014).
85
Id. at 581 (“To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force the legislatures that sponsor prayers and
the courts that are asked to decide these cases to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech, a rule that
would involve government in religious matters to a far greater degree than is the case under the town’s current
practice of neither editing or approving prayers in advance nor criticizing their content after the fact.”).
86
Id. at 585-86 (“[T]he Constitution does not require [the town] to search beyond its borders for non-Christian
prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing. The quest . . . would require the town ‘to make wholly
inappropriate judgments about the number of religions [it] should sponsor and the relative frequency with which it
should sponsor each’ . . . [which would be] a form of government entanglement with religion that is far more
troublesome than the current approach.”) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 617 (Souter, J., concurring)).
87
Id. at 582 (“[I]t would be unwise to adopt what respondents think is the next-best option: permitting those
religious words, and only those words, that are acceptable to the majority, even if they will exclude some.”).
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establishment. 88
In an effort to cut through the confusion, the Court recently signaled a more sweeping
shift in how it approaches these cases. In American Legion v. American Humanist
Association, 89 the Court looked to historical events and understandings as a guide for
interpreting the Establishment Clause. The case addressed a state-sponsored World War I
memorial featuring a large Latin cross that was alleged to prefer the Christian faith. There is no
denying that a Latin cross is the preeminent symbol of Christianity, for it speaks of the atoning
sacrifice of Jesus Christ and is widely recognized as such. There also is no denying that the 32foot long cross was the dominant feature of the WW I memorial located on a traffic island at a
major highway intersection in Maryland.
Justice Alito began his opinion for the 7 to 2 Court by acknowledging that a Latin cross
is profoundly religious for Christians, but he argued that at the same time the WW I memorial
cross can be secular in its meaning from the viewpoint state. 90 Further, a memorial or similar
display can have a religious meaning at the outset, but then the object’s meaning—at least for
the state—can evolve and transform over time. 91 Thus the circuit court was mistaken to
conclude that a Latin cross is inherently Christian and thus per se unconstitutional no matter the
longevity of the symbol or other alterations to its context. In this regard, the Court majority
entertained the theory—contested by plaintiffs—that the Memorial Committee initially had
adopted the design because Americans first visualized the Great War in terms of the rows upon
rows of individual white crosses at military gravesites in Europe. 92
In holding that the memorial’s cross did not violate the Establishment Clause, six of the
seven Justices in the majority 93 sharply criticized the test announced almost 60 years ago in
Lemon v. Kurtzman. 94 They then proceeded to follow a different interpretative approach. Four
Id. at 581 (“Government may not mandate a civic religion that stifles any but the most generic reference to the
sacred any more than it may prescribe a religious orthodoxy.”). In Lee v. Weisman, the Court had already said,
“The suggestion that government may establish an official or civic religion as a means of avoiding the
establishment of a religion with more specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction . . . .” 505 U.S. at 590.
89
139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (plurality opinion in part). Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I, II-B, II-C, III, and IV. Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and JJ. Breyer and Kavanaugh, delivered
a plurality with respect to Parts II-A and II-D.
90
Id. at 2074, 2090. See also id. at 2082-83 (arguing that “longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices” tend
to develop secular purposes and meanings alongside their religious origins); id. at 2075 (“The image used in the
Bladensburg memorial—a plain Latin cross—also took on new meaning after World War I . . . .”) (footnote
omitted).
91
Id. at 2074, 2075, 2085-87, 2089-90.
92
Id. at 2089 (“That the cross originated as a Christian symbol and retains that meaning in many contexts does not
change the fact that the symbol took on an added secular meaning when used in World War I memorials.”). See
also id. at 2076, 2085.
93
Of the seven justices in the majority, only Justice Kagan would keep at least the first two prongs of the Lemon
test. Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring in part).
94
403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Court in Lemon said that a government’s law or practice challenged under the
Establishment Clause must pass a test consisting of three factors: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Id. at 612-13 (internal quotation
88
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of the six, now a plurality, interpreted the Establishment Clause by aligning it with historical
practices and understandings. 95 Justice Alito, in this part of his opinion commanding only a
plurality, collected examples from federal historical events and noted that officials involved in
these occurrences were careful to embrace multiple Christian denominations and to disparage
no faiths. 96 He did not claim that these historical examples were inclusive of all faiths.
However, given the 1919–1925 period when the memorial was designed and erected, it was
sufficient that those who conceived the memorial, centered as it was on a large Latin cross,
moved forward in a spirit of inclusiveness with respect to religion and did not intentionally
disparage others.
III. THE PROHIBITION ON RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS AND THE RHETORIC OF
“ENTANGLEMENT” AND “ENTANGLEMENT AVOIDANCE”
In Thomas v. Review Board, 97 the state sought to defeat an employee’s free exercise
claim challenging the government’s denial of unemployment compensation. Thomas was laid
off from a factory when he refused to work on parts for military tanks because he was a
religious pacifist. By using the testimony of a co-worker who was also a longtime member of
the same religion as Thomas, the state sought to show that Thomas, a new convert, was
misapplying the teachings of his denomination. The Supreme Court would have none of it,
observing that Thomas “drew a line” concerning his beliefs that the state had to accept lest the
civil courts become “arbiters of scriptural interpretation.” 98
It is common for the modern Supreme Court to declare that the judiciary must avoid
legal classifications that cause it to probe into the religious meaning of words, practices, or
events, 99 as well as for the courts to avoid making determinations concerning the centrality of a

marks omitted). It appears the Lemon test is dead, but the approach in American Legion is as close as the Court
will get to explicitly pronouncing it dead.
95
American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087-88 (Alito, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and
Kavanaugh).
96
Id. at 2087-88.
97
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
98
Id. at 715, 716. Thomas was a Jehovah’s Witness. He believed his religion prohibited him from working in a
factory on the task of fabricating turrets for military tanks. Id. at 710.
99
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 843-44 (1995) (university should avoid distinguishing
between evangelism, on the one hand, and the expression of ideas merely approved by a given religion); Bob
Jones, 461 U.S. at 604 n.30 (avoiding potentially entangling inquiry into religious practice); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 269-70 n.6, 272 n.11 (1981) (holding that inquiries into religious significance of words or events are
to be avoided); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16 (not within judicial function or competence to resolve religious
differences); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 450 (Congress permitted to accommodate “all war” pacifists but not “just war”
inductees because to broaden the exemption invites increased church-state entanglements and would render almost
impossible the fair and uniform administration of selective service system); Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 (avoiding
entanglement that would follow should tax authorities evaluate the temporal worth of religious social welfare
programs is desirable); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-07 (1940) (petty officials not to be given
discretion to determine what is a legitimate “religion” for purposes of issuing permit); see also Rusk v. Espinosa,
456 U.S. 951 (1982) (aff’d mem.) (striking down charitable solicitation ordinance that required officials to
distinguish between “spiritual” and secular purposes underlying solicitation by religious organizations).
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religious belief that has been drawn into question. 100 Such declarations affirm what is an
important restraint on the jurisdictional reach of the courts. Typically called the “religious
question doctrine,” the rule bars the judiciary—indeed all civil officials and authorities—from
attempting to resolve disputes over the correctness of what a religious person or organization
believes, or from taking up an issue that goes to the validity, meaning, or importance of a
religious belief or practice.
The prohibition on religious questions developed in response to a threefold concern: (1)
judges lack competence to resolve doctrinal questions; (2) the government must not interfere in
matters internal to a given religion; and (3) when a court favors one interpretation of a sacred
text or miraculous event over competing interpretations, there is a micro establishment of
religion. There are two meanings to the concern about lack of judicial competence. First, the
civil courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over religious questions. Second, civil
judges do not have the theological training and experience to rightly divine answers to religious
questions. 101 The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is attributable to the Establishment Clause.
It is a mark of a state church, such as the Church of England, that the civil government
determines the doctrine and liturgy of the church. When government in any of its offices,
including the office of civil judge, takes on the business of resolving religious disputes, it ends
up favoring one side and disfavoring the other. That corrupts voluntary religion and is divisive
within the civic polity. Government divining and dictating religious truth (or falsehood) has
inevitably resulted in a breach of the peace by inflaming and multiplying civic divisions along
religious lines. The American solution is to bracket religious questions and move them outside
the government’s authority, resulting in more liberty and more domestic tranquility. This is
church-state separation at its most constructive. Of course, political and religious disagreement
and division is protected by the Free Speech Clause. 102 Divisiveness does not itself violate the
Establishment Clause, but certain governmental actions that help cause divisions along
religious lines do violate the clause. For example, when government takes sides in a religious
controversy, it is violating the rule against religious questions—and exercising such authority is
forbidden by the Establishment Clause.
RFRA 103 has been the cause of some high-stakes applications of the religious question
rule. When filing a claim under RFRA, an element of the prima facie case is to show that
See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (rejecting free exercise
test that “depend[s] on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual
development”); Amos, 483 U.S. at 336 (recognizing a problem when government attempts to divine which jobs are
sufficiently related to the core of a religious organization so as to merit exemption from statutory duties is
desirable); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (rejecting government’s argument that free exercise
claim does not lie unless “payment of social security taxes will . . . threaten the integrity of the Amish religious
belief or observance”); Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87 (same).
101
The latter task is not akin to the choice-of-law problem of a judge determining the law of a foreign country.
Rather, in many instances religious doctrine has evolved, or is said by one faction to have evolved, such that the
task of determining current orthodoxy is both contested ground and a moving target.
102
See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 641 (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan
observes that religious organizations have as much right as other types of organizations to engage in political
activism.
103
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.
100
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claimants are “substantially burden[ed]” in their religion. 104 The substantial-burden element
does not invite a judicial inquiry into whether the religious belief at issue is central to or
mandated by the claimant’s faith system. 105 That would be a question concerning the
importance or meaning of the religious belief at issue and thus forbidden. Rather, as the Court
held in Hobby Lobby, the question the text of RFRA poses is whether the challenged law or
policy “presents believers with the choice of either violating their religious beliefs or suffering
a substantial penalty.” 106 In Hobby Lobby, an employer’s failure to provide the required
contraception coverage in health care plans for its employees, or to direct its insurance carrier
do it at no additional cost to the employer, resulted in tens of thousands of dollars in fines.
Fines at that level easily met the substantial-burden element.
Similarly, in Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 107 the Third Circuit found that
the order of Little Sisters failed RFRA’s required showing of a substantial burden on religion.
The health care regulations required that the Little Sisters merely sign a certificate to relieve the
religious order of the contraception mandate, in which case the insurance carrier would take
over the legal duty. The circuit court deemed this a minor, one-time inconvenience to the Little
Sisters. 108 You can almost imagine the circuit panel wrongly thinking, “Look, Sisters, just sign
the piece of paper and be done with it, once and for all. How hard is that?” But the substantialburden element does not ask how easy it would be for religious claimants to violate the
teachings of their faith in order to comply with the offending law. That would be a judgment
concerning the importance of a religious practice to the claimant and thus violates the rule
against answering religious questions. Rather, RFRA’s substantial-burden element frames the
inquiry as one that can be answered by a civil judge: “What harm occurs if the religious
claimant remains faithful and disobeys the law?” The Little Sisters would have incurred
thousands of dollars in penalties if they did not comply—easily a substantial burden as the
Court had previously held in Hobby Lobby. 109
It was in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, 110 that the Supreme Court first sang the
virtues of avoiding entanglement between the institutions of church and state. A property tax
exemption for churches was not only found to be consistent with the Establishment Clause, but
the Court praised the exemption because it avoided administrative entanglements otherwise
present in the property appraisal and tax administration of ad valorem statutes. 111 Just one year
later in Lemon, the Court fashioned a wholly new requirement that governments eschew
“excessive entanglement” between church and state to avoid violating the Establishment
Id. at 2000bb-1(a).
This principle was added to RFRA by amendment in August 2000. See Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
106
573 U.S. at 726.
107
140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).
108
See Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 930 F.3d 543, 572-74 (3d Cir. 2019), reversed Little Sisters of
the Poor v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).
109
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 720.
110
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
111
Id. at 674 (holding that exemption had the laudable effect of not expanding “the involvement of government
[with religious organizations] by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the
direct confrontation and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes”). See also id. at 676.
104
105
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Clause. 112 However, in a complex society a certain level of regulatory interaction between
church and state is inevitable, even desirable. For example, churches could hardly be exempt
from building safety codes or zoning ordinances. While the Lemon test is now in disfavor, for a
time there were cases where administrative entanglement alone, deemed to be excessive by
some measure never quantified, led to laws being deemed unconstitutional. 113 That unhappy
state of affairs seems to finally have gotten sorted, and “entanglement” is no longer a standalone violation of the Establishment Clause. The idea that regulatory entanglements
independently implicate the Establishment Clause has now been narrowed and subsumed into
other existing prohibitions like the prohibition on religious questions. Judges and lawyers
continue to refer to “entanglement” as a descriptor for when a church-state boundary has been
crossed, but that is just a succinct and colorful way of describing some other failure by officials
to heed the rule against taking up religious questions.
The religious question prohibition does not forbid government authorities from
inquiring into the sincerity of a party asserting a claim to religious freedom. 114 As difficult as it
can be to measure what is in the hearts of people with respect to their religious profession,
requiring sincerity is a logical necessity. The Religion Clauses must not be allowed to become a
refuge for fakers, frauds, and charlatans.
The scope of the religious question rule also leaves room for government to make
inquiries about a religion. These are factual findings identifying a given religion’s nature,
beliefs, or practices that do not go on to assess their validity, meaning, or importance. For
example, a civil magistrate, using the familiar rules of evidence, can determine whether a
community center or an international disaster relief organization is a religious employer that
therefore qualifies for an exemption from federal employment nondiscrimination laws. 115 It is
no invasion of religious freedom to ask an employer, claiming to be statutorily exempt because
religious, to demonstrate that it is organized under state law as a religious corporation and that
it holds itself out to the public as such. A recent decision concerning collective bargaining and
a religious college is illustrative. Reversing a prior decision to the contrary, the National Labor
Relations Board ruled that lay faculty at a Lutheran college were not subject to union
organization. 116 The prior case law recognized collective bargaining rights for lay faculty
unless a college was “substantially religious in character.” 117 That put the NLRB in the position
of making exacting inquiries into the religious curriculum and other programs at the college,
and then weighing the religious importance of these classes and other faculty tasks. Judging the
degree of religiosity of these matters was unconstitutionally entangling. To avoid transgressing
112
See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (“entanglement” elevated to a third test for measuring Establishment Clause
compliance).
113
Lemon held that state programs to aid K-12 religious schools generated excessive entanglement between
church and state in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 617-18.
114
The leading case on sincerity as necessary to invoking a religious freedom claim under the First Amendment is
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
115
See, e.g., Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (developing an
approach for determining who is a religious organization and thus able to invoke the religious employer
exemption); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center, 503 F.3d 217, 226-29 (3d Cir. 2007) (same).
116
Bethany College and Thomas Jorsch and Lisa Guinn, 369 NLRB 1 (No. 98, June 10, 2020).
117
Id. at 2.
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the religious question rule, the NLRB’s new three-part inquiry looks only to whether the
college: (1) holds itself out to the public as religious; (2) is a nonprofit entity; and (3) is
affiliated with a church or other religious organization. 118 Such findings of fact are permitted
because they are about religion.
IV. THE CHURCH AUTONOMY DOCTRINE MORE GENERALLY
With respect to matters of internal governance, churches and other religious societies
are immune from regulation or other juridical burdens. 119 This has come to be known as the
doctrine of church autonomy. 120 While the principles of church autonomy reference both
Religion Clauses, 121 they are most easily derived from the Establishment Clause because of its
natural grounding in church-state separation.
The rule against religious questions discussed in Part III is a subpart of the church
autonomy doctrine. Church autonomy also entails the selection and application of the
organization’s polity (i.e., ecclesiology), the selection and control of clergy and other ministers
(i.e., ecclesiasticism), and the admission and retention of church members. Common in this
area of law are religious disputes over title to church property. Many state courts have devised
“neutral principles of law” as a means of settling these disagreements. The formation of such
neutral principles is permitted by the Supreme Court, even encouraged. But their adoption is
permitted only if the neutral principles do not transgress church autonomy. In other words, the
legal principles or rules adopted to settle a church title dispute are “neutral” only if they honor
the doctrine of church autonomy.
The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause each have their own line of case
precedent. There is a distinct, third line of cases that tracks the development of church
autonomy. That there is this third line of precedent further confirms that church autonomy is a
separate and distinct principle of religious freedom. So under the First Amendment there are
Establishment Clause cases, Free Exercise Clause cases, and church autonomy cases.
The first case in this third line is Watson v. Jones. 122 The Supreme Court in Watson laid
down the first broad principles of church autonomy when courts deal with disputes within
religious bodies that implicate doctrine, polity, and ecclesiastical oversight. 123 To avoid
trespassing on church autonomy courts should defer to church judicatories:
Id. at 3-4.
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[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which
the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as
final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them. 124
Watson was a post-Civil War case that involved a struggle between two factions of a local
Presbyterian church for control of the church building. Title to the property was in the name of
the trustees of the local church. However, the deed and charter of the local church “subjected
both property and trustees alike to the operation of [the general church’s] fundamental laws.” 125
The general church (denomination) was the Presbyterian Church of the United States. Its
governing body was called the General Assembly. The ecclesiastical rules of the General
Assembly stated that it possessed “the power of deciding in all controversies respecting
doctrine and discipline.” 126
Following the Civil War, the General Assembly ordered the members of all local
congregations who believed in a divine basis for slavery to “repent and forsake these sins.” 127
A majority of the local church members were willing to comply with the directive. A
minority faction, however, deemed the resolution of the Assembly a departure from the
doctrine held at the time when the local church first joined with the general church. The
minority’s legal theory was that the general church held an interest in the property subject
to an implied trust. The condition said to be implied was that the church adhere to its
original doctrines. Any departure by the general church meant a breach of trust and thus
forfeiture of its interest in the property. Accordingly, the minority faction claimed that the
l o c a l majority relinquished any right to control the property when the general church
repudiated the original, proslavery doctrine. Because they were the “true church,” the
minority faction maintained that it should be awarded the local real estate. 128
The Supreme Court rejected the implied-trust theory— which originated in
English law with its established Church of England 129—because t h e departure from
doctrine inquiry would require civil adjudication of a religious question. The Watson Court
gave three r e a s o n s for d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t i t d i d n o t h a v e jurisdiction over the
case: (1) civil judges are unschooled in religious doctrine and thereby not competent to
resolve disputes concerning religious doctrine nor to properly interpret church documents
and canon law; 130 (2) for the civil law to award the property to the faction adhering to
original doctrine would entail the government taking sides, thereby “establishing” one

Watson, 80 U.S. at 727.
Id. at 683.
126
Id. at 682.
127
Id. at 691.
128
Id. at 691-94.
129
Id. at 727-28.
130
Id. at 729, 730, 732.
124
125

20

creedal position while severely inhibiting r e f o r m o f religious doctrine; 131 and, (3) both
clerics and lay members of a church have voluntarily joined the entire church, the general
as well as the local body, thus giving implied consent to the polity of the entire church and
its a dministration. 132 These bases for church autonomy are rooted, said the Court, in the
American governmental system that—unlike the English system—separates the institutions
of church and state, thereby sharply limiting the involvement of civil courts in the
governance of religious bodies. 133
Watson’s principles were elevated to First Amendment stature in Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral. 134 The Supreme Court in Kedroff struck down a New York statute that
displaced control of the Russian Orthodox Churches from the central governing hierarchy
located in the Soviet Union with a church sub-organization limited to the Diocese of North
America. The felt need to transfer control of ecclesiastical authority was linked to the Marxist
Revolution of 1917 and doubt concerning whether Moscow had “a true central organization of
the Russian Orthodox Church capable of functioning as the head of a free international
religious body.” 135 Because the statute did more than just “permit the trustees of the Cathedral
[in New York City] to use it for services consistent with the desires of the members,” but
transferred effective control over domestic churches by legislative fiat, 136 the Court held that
the statute violated the “rule of separation between church and state.” 137 The Watson Court had
repudiated the English implied-trust rule and its departure from doctrine standard, but only as a
matter of federal common law. For well over half a century a number of states had continued to
follow the implied-trust rule as a matter of their own common law. Kedroff, however, clearly
foreshadowed the sweeping aside of the common law in those states still following the
English rule.
In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Church, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that Kedroff elevated the principles of church autonomy to First Amendment
stature. 138 Presbyterian Church involved a dispute between a general church and two of its
local congregations over who had the authority to control the local church properties. The
controversy began when the local churches claimed that the general church had violated
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the organization’s constitution and had departed from original doctrine and practice. 139
Georgia still followed the implied-trust rule with its requisite fact finding into alleged
departures from doctrine. This required the state court to determine two religious’
questions: what were the tenets of the general church at the time the local congregation
first affiliated, and whether the general church had departed substantially from initial
doctrines. On the basis of a jury’s finding that the general church had abandoned its
original doctrines, the Georgia courts entered judgment for the local congregations. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not permit a departure from
doctrine standard as a substantive rule of decision. The “American concept of the
relationship between church and state,” 140 the Court said, “leaves the civil court no role in
determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes.” 141
Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, observed that in principle courts could
take jurisdiction of disputes over church property provided they followed neutral principles
to be applied to all such similar claims to resolve disputes over title. 142
The Supreme Court in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich 143 rejected an
Illinois bishop’s lawsuit challenging a top-down reorganization of the American-Canadian
Diocese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church and his removal from office. Milivojevich
involved internal church administration and a clerical appointment, which the Court
determined were insulated from civil review under the First Amendment. 144 There was no
dispute between the parties that the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church was a hierarchical
church and that the sole power to remove clerics rested with the ecclesiastical body in Europe
that had decided the bishop’s case. 145 Nor was there any question that the matter at issue was a
religious dispute. 146 Nevertheless, the state court had decided in favor of the defrocked bishop
in Illinois because, in its view, the church’s adjudicatory procedures were applied in an
arbitrary manner. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an arbitrariness exception to the
judicial-deference rule of Watson when the question concerns church polity or supervision of
a bishop. 147 When the subject of the dispute is within one of the spheres of church
autonomy, civil courts may not examine whether the church judicatory properly followed its
own rules of procedure. 148 To accept jurisdiction over such a subject matter is not “consistent
with the constitutional mandate [that] the civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the
highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline,
faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.” 149
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Using reasoning similar to that in Watson, the Milivojevich Court explained that there
are three bases for a First Amendment prohibition on civil court jurisdiction in such cases.
First, civil courts cannot delve into canon law or church documents. 150 These matters are too
sensitive to permit any civil probing because such inquiries may prove intrusive and entail the
court taking sides in a religious dispute. Second, civil judges have no training in canon law and
theological interpretation. 151 Third, the “[c]onstitutional concepts of due process, involving
secular notions of ‘fundamental fairness,’” cannot be borrowed from American civil law and
grafted onto a church’s polity to somehow “modernize” the church. 152 The Supreme Court also
reversed the state court’s unraveling of the diocesan reorganization, holding that the Illinois
court had impermissibly “delved into the various church constitutional provisions” relevant to
“a matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs.” 153 The
enforcement of church documents, often unclear to a civil judge, cannot be accomplished
“without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity.” 154
The Supreme Court held in Jones v. Wolf that courts may, in limited instances,
devise “neutral principles of law” to adjudicate intrachurch disputes that affect title to
property. 155 Courts may examine church charters, constitutions, deeds, and trust indentures
to resolve property disputes using “objective, well-established concepts of trust and
property law familiar to lawyers and judges.” 156 The method’s advantage is that it
sometimes “obviates entirely the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical
polity or doctrine in settling church property disputes . . . .” 157 However, a neutralprinciples approach may not be used where it trespasses into any of the subjects reserved to
church autonomy. The Court said it was clear “that the First Amendment severely
circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes.” 158
In Watson, the rule of judicial deference was encouraged as a means of resolving a
dispute while still honoring church autonomy doctrine. That can work in a church with a
hierarchical polity. In Wolf, “neutral principles of law” was approved as an alternative to
judicial deference. Neither rule is an exception to the doctrine of church autonomy. Rather,
these two rules are alternative means of resolving an intrachurch dispute over title while still
honoring the principles of church autonomy:
[T]here may be cases where the deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution
of the general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating
to the ownership of property. In such a case, if the interpretation of the
150
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instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious
controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by
the authoritative ecclesiastical body. 159
In other words, the state-provided dispute resolution principles are “neutral” only if they avoid
religious questions or otherwise transgressing on church autonomy.
In January 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC. 160 This was the Court’s first church
autonomy case since Wolf was decided in 1979. Hosanna-Tabor involved a fourth-grade
teacher, Cheryl Perich, who sued her employer, a church-related religious school, alleging
retaliation for having asserted rights under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). 161 In the
lower federal courts, the school raised the “ministerial exception.” The defense recognizes that
religious organizations have exclusive authority to select their own ministers—which
necessarily entails not just initial hiring but also promotion, retention, and all the other terms
and conditions of employment. As a matter of First Amendment church autonomy, the
ministerial exception overrides not just the ADA, but a number of venerable employment
nondiscrimination civil rights statutes. 162
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, wrote that
“[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing
to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the
internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those
who will personify its beliefs.” 163 The Court said that although “the interest of society in the
enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important . . . so too is the
interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry
out their mission.” 164 Accordingly, in a lawsuit that strikes at the ability of the church to
determine its leaders and teachers, any balancing of interests between a vigorous eradication of
employment discrimination, on the one hand, and institutional religious freedom, on the other,
is a balance already struck on the side of church autonomy: “When a minister who has been
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fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment
has struck the balance for us.” 165
In Hosanna-Tabor, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of the Solicitor General
(“OSG”) claimed that there was no ministerial exception because the First Amendment did not
require one. All that was required, argued the OSG, was that the government be formally
neutral with respect to religion and religious organizations. That was the case here, said the
OSG, because the ADA treats religious organizations just like every other employer when it
comes to discrimination on the basis of disability. The same is true of federal and state civil
rights statutes prohibiting discrimination on the bases of sex, age, race, and so forth. The OSG
allowed as how religious organizations had freedom of expressive association, but so did labor
unions and service clubs, and they were still subject to the ADA. 166 The nondiscrimination
statutes could be blind to religion and religious organizations, asserted the OSG. And while
Congress could choose to accommodate religion, the First Amendment did not require it to do
so.
The Court reacted to the OSG’s argument for a religion-blind Constitution by calling it
“remarkable,” “untenable,” and “hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself,
which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.” 167 Religious
organizations have freedom of expressive association, not merely to the same degree as other
expressional groups, but much more. The text of the First Amendment recognizes the unique
status of organized religion, and a properly conceived separation of church and state that is to
the good of both. 168 So the Hosanna-Tabor Court held that the First Amendment requires a
ministerial exception that is a defense in the nature of an immunity. 169
Before proceeding to examine more closely the facts that convinced the Court that this
teacher was a minister for purposes of the exception, the Chief Justice had to distinguish
Employment Division v. Smith. 170 In Smith, the state of Oregon had listed peyote, a
hallucinogenic, as one of several controlled substances and criminalized its use. The plaintiffs
in Smith were Native Americans who had been employed as counselors at a private drug
rehabilitation center. 171 They were fired for illegal drug use after they ingested peyote in a
religious ceremony, and they were later denied unemployment compensation by the state
because they were dismissed for cause. The Smith Court held that the Free Exercise Clause was
not implicated when Oregon enacted a religiously neutral law of general applicability, even
when the law happened to have an adverse impact on the religious use of peyote.
165
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Chief Justice Roberts admitted that the ADA was a neutral law of general applicability
that happened to have an adverse effect on the Lutheran school’s personnel decisions. 172 But
then, for a unanimous Court, he drew a distinction: “The present case, in contrast [to Smith],
concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and
mission of the church itself.” 173 Without the ministerial exception, a civil court would be
ordering a church to employ a minister by command of the state—historically an act of a state
with an established church. The Court proceeded to carve out a class of cases based on subject
matter to which the rule in Smith does not apply: those involving decisions within the church’s
sphere of self-governance. The Court’s stepping around Smith is confirming evidence that
church autonomy doctrine gives rise to a third line of cases separate from Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause precedent.
Obviously, a sacrament is an important religious practice, and the Smith plaintiffs
suffered a material burden on their religious observance that was unrelieved by the rule in
Smith. But the point of church autonomy is not to relieve religious burdens as such. If it were,
then Hosanna-Tabor would have been at odds with and thereby overruled Smith. That did not
happen. Rather, Hosanna-Tabor distinguished Smith. What was remedied in Hosanna-Tabor
was not a burden on an organization’s religious practice—that would be a Free Exercise Clause
case—but the government’s intrusion into the self-governance of a religious organization—a
church autonomy case. Acts of self-governance need not be religiously motivated. As the Court
observed, “[t]he purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a
minister only when it is made for a religious reason.” 174
The Hosanna-Tabor Court went on to provide another example in which Smith does not
apply: in lawsuits over title to church property, the government may not take sides on the
question concerning the rightful ecclesiastical authority to resolve the property dispute. 175
Again, the purpose of church autonomy is not to safeguard the decision to determine the
rightful ecclesiastical authority only when it is made out of religious reasons.
These two examples—a church selecting its own minister and a church determining the
ecclesiastical judicatory with final authority to solve disputes over title to property—are
contrasted with the religious practice at issue in Smith: an individual’s ingestion of peyote as
part of a sacrament. The former go to internal governance, the issue in Smith does not.
A survey of the High Court’s cases yields relatively few—yet important—subject
matters of the sort where civil officials have been barred categorically from exercising
authority: (1) the validity, meaning, or importance of religious questions, and resolving
doctrinal disputes; 176 (2) the selection of ecclesiastical polity, including the proper application
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of procedures set forth in a church’s organic documents, bylaws, and canons; 177 (3) the
selection, credentialing, promotion, overseeing, discipline, or retention of clerics and others
who are ministers by virtue of job function; 178 and (4) the admission, discipline, or expulsion of
church members. 179
Church autonomy cases are relatively few but they are important because once it is
determined the rule applies, no rejoinder is permitted by the opposing party. That is, once it is
determined that a suit falls within the subject matter of internal church governance, there is no
follow-on judicial balancing. There is no balancing because there can be no legally sufficient
governmental interest to justify interfering in internal church affairs. The First Amendment has
already struck the balance. 180 In this regard, the Court criticized the OSG’s argument that the
school’s religious reason for firing Perich was pretextual. “This suggestion misses the point of
the ministerial exception,” wrote the Chief Justice:
The purpose of the [ministerial] exception is not to safeguard a church’s
decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The
exception instead ensures that the authority to select and control who will
minister to the faithful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical,” . . . is the church’s
alone. 181
Lower courts applying Hosanna-Tabor have properly interpreted the ministerial exception not
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Tabor is a constraint on the power of the government explains why the case is rooted in large
part in the Establishment Clause. The text of that clause bespeaks a structural limit on
authority: “Congress shall make no law” about a given subject matter described as “an
establishment of religion.” As Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “the Free Exercise Clause . . .
protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission” by controlling who are its
ministers, and “the Establishment Clause . . . prohibits government involvement in such
ecclesiastical decisions.” 183 The Chief Justice gave examples in which the English Crown had
interfered with the appointment of clergy in the established Church of England. 184 He wrote
that the Establishment Clause was adopted in America to flatly deny such power to our national
government. 185
There is a welcome absence of balancing tests in Hosanna-Tabor. Such tests abound in
past areas of doctrine derived from the Religion Clauses, including: the prohibition on
governmental endorsements of religion thought to lower the standing of religious minorities in
the political community; 186 a requirement that a law’s “principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” as distinct from lesser effects; 187 and injunctions on
government’s “excessive entanglement” with religion, as distinct from less intense
entanglements. 188 Balancing tests are still valid under the Free Exercise Clause, but not in cases
where the subject matter warrants the categorical protection of what Justice Alito calls
“religious autonomy.” 189 In the latter instances, the First Amendment, understood within
structural protection “rooted in constitutional limits on judicial authority”).
183
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America’s state-by-state disestablishments that broke with European models and gave rise to
church-state separation, 190 has determined that hiring, promoting, supervising, and dismissing
ministers is a power denied to Caesar.
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor went on to find that the fourth-grade teacher, Cheryl
Perich, was a “minister” and therefore her claim must be dismissed. Perich held an earned lay
title issued by her denomination. She also held herself out under the title of minister to claim
tax advantages and for other reasons. It was not clear to the lower courts if the ministerial
exception was limited to organizational leaders, visionaries, and top administrators, 191 or if the
definition also extended to those performing explicitly religious functions like teaching
religion, leading students in chapel service, and directing students in classroom prayer. Perich
was not an organizational leader or denominational visionary, but on the whole her job duties
reflected a role in conveying the church’s message and carrying out its mission of transmitting
the Lutheran faith.
The circuit court in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru—when
addressing application of the ministerial exception—treated the foregoing items in HosannaTabor as requirements on a check list. 192 The High Court reversed. Writing for a 7-2 Court,
Justice Alito began by noting that the ministerial exception is a part of the more encompassing
“general principle of church autonomy” that relies on both the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. 193 In the two cases that were consolidated for the appeal in Our Lady, the Court said:
The independence of religious institutions in matters of faith and
doctrine is closely linked to independence in what we have termed “matters of
church government.” . . . This does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a
general immunity from secular laws, but it does protect their autonomy with
respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s
central mission. And a component of this autonomy is the selection of the
individuals who play certain key roles.
. . . Under this rule, courts are bound to stay out of employment disputes
involving those holding certain important positions with churches and other
religious institutions. . . . [A] wayward minister’s preaching, teaching, and
counseling could contradict the church’s tenets and lead the congregation away
from the faith. The ministerial exception was recognized to preserve a church’s
independent authority in such matters. 194
The Court went on to find that the two elementary classroom teachers were “ministers” for
purposes of the exception. Their employment claims alleging discrimination on the basis of age
See CARL H. ESBECK AND JONATHAN J. DEN HARTOG EDS., DISESTABLISHMENT AND RELIGIOUS DISSENT:
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE NEW AMERICAN STATES, 1776–1833 10-12 (2019) [hereinafter
DISESTABLISHMENT AND RELIGIOUS DISSENT].
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and disability, respectively, were ordered to be dismissed. The nonrenewal of their employment
contracts were said by the schools to be based on poor classroom performance, 195 and thus the
dismissals did not hinge on the schools having a religious reason for severing the employment
relationship. That makes sense because what is being protected here is “autonomy with respect
to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s central mission,” not a
religious right vested in the employer.
The Our Lady Court admitted that it would have been easier to find that the claimants
were “ministers” if they satisfied the items on the checklist from Hosanna-Tabor, but it held
that none of those items were required. 196 What mattered was what the employees actually
did, 197 and the sort of institutions at which they were employed. 198 The two classroom teachers
had duties that were explicitly religious. The institutions here were K-12 religious schools,
schools which are integral to passing on the Catholic faith to the next generation. The claimants
taught classes in Catholic doctrine, led the students in classroom prayer and recitation of
creeds, accompanied the students to weekly mass, and agreed to employment contracts setting
forth the religious mission of the school and agreeing to do nothing to undermine it. 199 The
teachers “were also expected to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of
living their lives in accordance with the faith.” 200 When “a school with a religious mission
entrusts a teacher with the responsibility of educating and forming students in the faith, judicial
intervention into disputes between the school and the teacher threatens the school’s
independence in a way that the First Amendment does not allow.” 201 So long as these functions
are religious, it does not matter how much clock time the functions comprise in the overall
school day. The guiding rule is not subject to a stopwatch test. 202
The schools preferred that their teachers were Catholic, but it was not required. To
require it would disadvantage small sects who had limited qualified applicants from which to
hire faculty and so could not always hire within the denomination. Further, it would entangle
the courts in religious questions if candidates were limited to the same church or
denomination. 203 For example, determining whether a faculty candidate was a Catholic in good
standing is to have the courts entangled in a forbidden religious question.
As can be seen, rather than a search for a religious “minister” in the ordinary sense of
that term (e.g., pastor, priest, rabbi, imam, and so on), 204 the Court is asking one of two
questions. Does the employee bear explicitly religious functions? That was the case in Our
Lady with these Catholic elementary school teachers. Or is the employee in a position of
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prominent leadership? If the answer to either question is in the affirmative, then the immunity
applies.
In deciding if a teacher is a “minister,” we cannot have civil courts determining which
faculty tasks are religiously important or meaningful and which are religiously unimportant or
minor. That would violate the rule against deciding religious questions. 205 In Our Lady, Justice
Thomas filed a concurring opinion stating that the determination as to who is a minister ought
to be unilaterally decided by the religious employer. That would avoid courts delving into
prohibited religious questions. 206 Justice Alito, for the Court, did not go that far. He noted the
explicitly religious functions of the teachers here: teaching religion, as well as leading students
in prayer and devotionals, attending mass with students. These tasks, of course, are explicitly
religious for Christians. As to other religions, Justice Alito appealed to religious employers to
make it clear which employees performed what the schools considered religious functions. “In
a country with the religious diversity of the United States, judges cannot be expected to have a
complete understanding and appreciation of the role played by every person who performs a
particular role in every religious tradition. A religious institution’s explanation of the role of
such employees in the life of the religion in question is important.” 207 The Court’s approach
was highly deferential to the two schools regarding their view that the teachers’ employment
functions were religious. The Court held that the two elementary teachers were “ministers” for
purposes of church autonomy. 208
Church autonomy involves freedom for religious organizations, but it is not a freedom
from burdens on a religious belief or practice. Rather, it is a freedom of a religious organization
to govern its internal affairs without interference by government. It is a defense that, when
established, operates like a categorical immunity from being sued concerning the organization’s
control over its doctrine, polity, and the selection and removal of the personnel that executes its
desire to perpetuate the faith or exercises leadership to carry out its central mission.
V. THE DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING RELIGION
The First Amendment’s use of the word “religion” necessarily makes the definition of
religion a question of constitutional law. Although a definition is of great theoretical difficulty,
in practice the issue rarely arises. Often the government stipulates to the nature of the claim
“being religious,” but raises other defenses. To avoid omitting unfamiliar and emerging
religions from constitutional protection, the Supreme Court has evaded defining the term. 209
Accordingly, the definition remains broad and indeterminate, 210 as well as inclusive of
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Id. at 2069-71 (Thomas. J., concurring, joined by Justice Gorsuch).
207
Id. at 2066.
208
Id. at 2066-69.
209
The Court has addressed the definition of religion for the purpose of legislation and the military draft, but not
for purposes of the First Amendment. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
210
A thoughtful discussion concerning the definition of religion appears in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 200 (3d
Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring in result). Judge Arlin Adams’ definition was later adopted in the Third Circuit
205

206

31

naturalistic, nontheistic, and anthropocentric religions. 211 However, if the definition is too
broad the law becomes meaningless. Thus, for example, the definition excludes a purely
personal or philosophical way of life. 212
Religious claimants under the First Amendment may disagree with members of their
own denomination, be unsure or wavering, 213 or be recent converts. 214 A religious claimant
need not be a member of an organized religious denomination, community, or sect. 215
However, a claimant must be sincere. 216 Lastly, the Establishment Clause is not implicated
when a law reflects a moral judgment about conduct that is harmful or beneficial to the
common good, even if a religion shares that judgment. 217
VI. CONCLUSION
The driving force behind the American disestablishment of state churches in the period
1776 to 1833 was straightforward, if difficult to implement after centuries of Christendom. 218
The idea was that it is best for both church and government when “religious beliefs are a matter
of voluntary choice by individuals and their [religious] associations, and that each sect is
entitled to ‘flourish [or fail] according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its
dogma.’” 219
With this principle in mind, the common thread that runs through most of the forgoing
cases is the minimization of the government’s influence over the religious choices of
individuals and organizations. In Espinoza, the rule of nondiscrimination in the funding of
religious and nonreligious private schools in Montana was not an end in itself. Rather, equal
treatment was a means to minimizing the government’s influence over the choices of parents
in Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982). He defined religion for
purposes of the First Amendment as a belief system that seeks comprehensive answers to life’s ultimate questions
with characteristics such as clergy, sacred literature, holy days, formal services, and efforts at propagation.
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when enrolling their children in school, religious or otherwise. Similarly, when imposing
general regulatory and tax burdens on society, the Court in Amos and Walz held that the
government may exempt religious persons and organizations from those same burdens. This is
government leaving religion alone, again minimizing its role so that private religious judgments
can be freely made.
Critics compare funding cases like Espinoza and its rule of equal treatment with cases
like Amos that have upheld religious exemptions, and they decry the apparent inconsistency.
When equality helps religion, you are for equality, say the critics, but when being exceptional
helps religion’s cause, you are for exemptions. Not so. The rule of equality and of exemptions
are merely instrumental, tools in the service of minimizing government’s impact on private
religious choice. The older term for this is religious voluntarism, the foregoing noted driving
force behind the disestablishment of religion in America’s revolutionary states.
Religious preferences are a different story, and so they are unconstitutional. These occur
when government interjects itself into a private dispute and takes the side of religion over the
interests of the other disputants. In Caldor, government unyieldingly sided with religious
employees wanting their Sabbath off. In Larkin, government sided with churches wanting
control over neighboring enterprises in busy downtowns. In both cases, the result was that some
private actors were compelled by law to boost the religious observance of others. That does not
minimize government’s influence over private religious choices, but increases it.
The same integrating principle of minimizing the government’s role over religious
choices largely fits the Supreme Court’s cases involving government speech of religious
content. Government should refrain from expressing itself in favor of (or against) an explicitly
religious message or a particular religious observance. That part is easy. The difficulty comes
in determining when the content of the government’s speech or observance is explicitly
religious and when it is something else, such as honoring the sacrifices of the nation’s war
dead, as with the WW I memorial cross in American Legion. That is not to say that the meaning
of a Latin cross to Christians is anything less than the reason for Christ’s coming to this earth.
It is just that the state of Maryland did not have in mind this explicitly Christian message when
it took over the maintenance of the memorial to soldiers who died in the Great War. This is not
a difficult concept: Government can have a secular message when sponsoring a memorial or
other symbol, while at the same time there are those in the private sector that hear or see in that
same symbol a profoundly religious message. The government is responsible only for its own
messages and points of view. The Bill of Rights does not hold government to account for the
multifarious interpretations of symbols by other viewers. The “not taking sides” principle
enters into American Legion with the findings that Maryland neither intended to exclude nonChristians nor sought to disparage the faiths of others.
Town of Greece v. Galloway is admittedly a harder case, but the municipality’s
reserving of time for local volunteers to render an opening prayer was understood as an attempt
to solemnize the work of the council. Americans are still a religious people, and such a people
instinctively seek to elevate the seriousness of an occasion, crisis, or civic danger with prayer.
And again, the “not taking sides” principle enters with the Supreme Court disallowing any
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government prayer that intentionally marginalizes other religions or disparages those who
practice them.
The rule against civil authorities taking up the validity, importance, or meaning of
religious questions, and the larger command to completely shield from state oversight those
discrete subjects entailing internal governance by churches, also work to minimize the
government’s role in private religious choice. However, the church autonomy doctrine is about
more than religious choices. The breathing space reserved by the doctrine is about sovereignty
concerning the leaders and propagators of a religious organization and their role in a ministry’s
operations, strategic planning, and vision for the future. There are a few things about religious
institutions that have to remain in their complete control, being essential not just to their present
wellbeing but also to their continued propagation, direction, and destiny. Over the centuries of
Western legal tradition, the church and the state have worked out their respective spheres of
authority. It is a laudable mark of governmental modesty when the modern regulatory state,
with all its considerable power, can pause to acknowledge that the long arm of its writ is not
without boundaries.
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